Collective Management Organizations (CMOs) sit at the heart of the copyright economy, helping creators manage and enforce their rights, collect royalties, and navigate the complex web of uses that define today’s creative industries. Because they act as intermediaries between rightsholders and users—often with considerable market power—their accountability and fairness are critical. Recognizing this crucial role and the need for robust governance, the Nigerian Copyright Commission recently revised the Collective Management Regulations “to promote transparency, accountability, and good governance among CMOs”. In line with these goals, the regulations also include a provision dedicated to complaints and dispute resolution, which is undoubtedly a positive advancement.
However, a close reading of Section 26(1) of the regulation, the dispute resolution provision, reveals a limitation: CMOs are only required to disclose their complaint procedures “upon demand”. In other words, unless its member or another CMO actively requests to see how complaints are handled, a CMO has no obligation to make such systems visible or easily accessible. This reactive posture raises important concerns—especially when considered from the lens of Dispute System Design (DSD), a field that focuses on how to build fair, effective, and inclusive systems for managing disputes.
In essence, I argue that if the goals of the drafters of the regulation includes ensuring fair and just outcomes and/or trust in the procedures for dealing with complaints, then waiting for someone to ask the right question is simply not enough. Let’s get into the weeds of it.
I. What Section 26(1) Provides
Section 26(1) of the 2025 Collective Management Regulations provides as follows:
“A CMO shall, upon demand, make available to its members and any CMO on whose behalf it manages rights under a representation agreement, its procedures for dealing with complaints, including those relating to authorization to manage rights, termination or withdrawal of rights, membership terms, payment of royalties, and any deduction from any payment due to a right owner.”
(Emphasis mine)
This is followed by an obligation to respond in writing to complaints, and to give reasons for rejecting any such complaint within 30 days (Section 26(2)). The regulation also allows for certain disputes to be referred to a Dispute Resolution Panel established under section 90 of the Copyright Act (Section 26(3)).
On its face, the regulation seems like a step toward greater transparency and accountability in collective rights management. But the phrase “upon demand” is the issue here. It suggests that CMOs are not required to publish their complaint-handling procedures proactively and publicly (i.e., only in response to the members and CMOs who ask). Rather, these procedures remain hidden until someone goes looking for them. This raises the following question: are CMOs being required to establish robust, visible, and accessible dispute systems—or merely to have something ready in case someone asks?
If the intention was otherwise, why wasn’t the requirement phrased more directly, such as: “CMOs shall proactively publish and ensure easy access to their procedures for dealing with complaints,” or, at the very least, why wasn’t the qualifier “upon demand” left out?
II. Why It Matters: A Dispute System Design (DSD) Perspective
Dispute System Design (DSD) offers a framework for evaluating and improving how organizations manage disputes—not only after a dispute arises, but also in how systems are structured to prevent, address, and learn from recurring disagreements. In contexts where disputes are predictable and frequent—as is the case in collective rights management—DSD emphasizes the need for systems that are transparent, accessible, participatory, and institutionalized rather than improvised or hidden.
From a DSD perspective, Section 26(1) falls short in several key respects, including the following:
a. Reactive Rather Than Proactive
By requiring CMOs to disclose their complaint procedures only “upon demand,” the regulation permits a reactive posture. This undermines the visibility and predictability of the system. Users and members—particularly smaller rightsholders—should not have to hunt for basic information about how to seek redress.
b. Opaque Gatekeeping
Because the regulation does not require proactive publication of procedures, CMOs retain control over who accesses what information and when. This creates a power imbalance—particularly harmful in a sector already marked by asymmetries in bargaining power and access to legal resources.
III. Comparative Glimpses
Nigeria is not alone in grappling with the challenges of ensuring fairness and transparency in collective rights management. But looking at how other jurisdictions have addressed similar concerns reveals just how modest the obligations under Section 26(1) truly are.
Take the European Union’s Collective Rights Management Directive (2014/26/EU). Article 21 (1j) & (2) of the Directive requires CMOs to make available detailed information on their complaint procedures on their websites. These procedures must be “effective and timely” and include access to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Similarly, the UK’s Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, as modified by the Collective Management of Copyright Regulations 2016, mandates that collecting societies publish their complaints and dispute resolution procedures openly (20(1) and 20 (3)(j)), and adhere to a published Code of Conduct that has been subject to stakeholder consultation.
In addition, the modest obligations under Section 26(1) is all the more striking when viewed against international guidance. The WIPO Good Practice Toolkit for Collective Management Organizations (2025) clearly states that “CMOs should provide for clear, effective and affordable internal dispute resolution procedures,” and that they should “make available to its Members, Rightholders and other CMOs… information on complaint and dispute resolution procedures,” including contact details, timelines, and appeal stages. Compared to this standard, Nigeria’s Regulation 26(1) is far too minimal—it leaves disclosure to chance and says nothing about structure, accessibility, or fairness. This limitation is particularly concerning given that the system for addressing complaints is designed and controlled by the CMO, which is an entity that is almost always a party to the disputes contemplated in Section 26.
IV. From “On Demand” to On Display
Section 26(1), while limited, does offer something important: it establishes a formal right to demand access to complaint procedures. That right can be leveraged, by creators, users, and other CMOs, to demand more accountability and responsiveness from collective management organizations. It is a foundation. It is just that this foundation is being laid in a regulatory culture that still treats dispute resolution as a secondary concern, rather than a core component of justice delivery in copyright management. The provision leaves too much to discretion. It does not require CMOs to build or publish standing systems. It does not define minimum standards for fairness, accessibility, or even clarity. And it does not require feedback mechanisms, periodic review, or participatory design—all of which are considered essential by contemporary dispute system design.
Consequently, Section 26(1) could be strengthened in several ways. CMOs should be required to publish their dispute resolution procedures in clear and accessible formats—on their websites, in member materials, and in public filings with the regulatory authority. The regulation should specify what a fair process looks like, including timelines, neutrality of decision-makers, right to representation, and appeal mechanisms. Creators, users, and other stakeholders should be involved in shaping the rules that govern their disputes. These specifications enhance legitimacy and foster systems that actually meet needs. The regulation should require CMOs to collect data on complaints, report on outcomes, and revise procedures periodically in light of experience. Also, while the regulation allows referral of disputes to a Panel under section 90 of the Copyright Act, it does not explain how this interacts with internal CMO complaint systems (as it only says “may be referred”). A clear pathway—from internal resolution to independent adjudication—would support access to justice.
Conclusion
As Nigeria continues to strengthen its copyright system, ensuring the fairness and accessibility of its regulatory frameworks is paramount. While Section 26(1) of the Collective Management Regulations, 2025 represents a step towards acknowledging the importance of dispute resolution, it also illuminates the path ahead. By shifting from an “on demand” to an “on display” approach for complaint procedures, Nigeria can align with international best practices and build a more just and trustworthy ecosystem for its creators and users alike. Embracing proactive disclosure and user-centered design principles will be crucial in fully realizing the promise of transparency, accountability, and good governance among CMOs.
Authored by: Mr. Seun Lari-Williams
Founding Partner, Nigeria The IP Press
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